Gonka Community Fund
vote.gonka: открытgovernance: успешенПоддержать с условиями

Return Withheld Miner Rewards: Redistribute Gov-Wallet Balance for Ep 132–247

Since v0.2.9 and v0.2.11, withheld miner rewards have accumulated in the gov account (~3 053 801 GNK). Proposal returns them via batch vesting to 1 623 miners, pro-rata by rewarded_coins per epoch.

Мнение по proposal

AI-черновик

Что говорит ревью

This is a payout / restitution proposal to return approximately 3.054M GNK held in the gov module account to miners from epochs 132–247, using a deterministic on-chain-data formula and executable batch vesting / multisend messages. The proposal has unusually concrete payout logic, a public reproduction repository, a named proposer, and a bounded recipient set. The main weaknesses are not the absence of a project plan, but payout-specific controls: independent reconciliation of the final executable messages, explicit conflict disclosure, a clear dispute/appeal window, and stronger handling of precedent and edge cases such as prior compensations and alleged abusive miners.

  • Strongest reason to support: the payout is bounded, formula-driven, and reproducible from on-chain data rather than relying on vague community sentiment.
  • Main reason for conditions: executable transfer safety and recipient correctness need independent reconciliation for a 3M+ GNK payout.
  • Main governance risk: returning slashed/withheld amounts may create perceived precedent or future incentives unless the community explicitly limits the scope.
Открыть публичное ревью

Запрос

3 053 801 GNK

Ответственный

Evgenii Maksimenkov

Подано

1 мая 2026 г.

Что думает коммьюнити

AI opinion - стартовая позиция. Ответы ниже помогают другим понять согласие, возражения и готовность голосовать.

Согласен

0

Согласен с условиями

0

Не согласен

0

Нужно больше данных

0

Ваше мнение

Governance голосование закрыто

Protocol result/status: успешен. Здесь еще можно оставить публичный комментарий, но голосование уже не активно.

Отношение к AI opinion
Если голосовать сейчас
Посмотреть governance result

Все ответы

Ответов пока нет. Можно быть первым.

Proposal простыми словами

О чем это

Since v0.2.9 and v0.2.11, withheld miner rewards have accumulated in the gov account (~3 053 801 GNK). Proposal returns them via batch vesting to 1 623 miners, pro-rata by rewarded_coins per epoch.

Запрос

3 053 801 GNK

Ответственный

Evgenii Maksimenkov

Почему это важно

Since v0.2.9 and v0.2.11, withheld miner rewards have accumulated in the gov account (~3 053 801 GNK). Proposal returns them via batch vesting to 1 623 miners, pro-rata by rewarded_coins per epoch.

Проблема

Since v0.2.9 and v0.2.11, withheld miner rewards have accumulated in the gov account (~3 053 801 GNK). Proposal returns them via batch vesting to 1 623 miners, pro-rata by rewarded_coins per epoch.

Что должно быть сделано

  • Imported tender outcome
Детали оценкиShow
Поддержать с условиямиAI-черновик

Framework score v2

Простое ревью

This is a payout / restitution proposal to return approximately 3.054M GNK held in the gov module account to miners from epochs 132–247, using a deterministic on-chain-data formula and executable batch vesting / multisend messages. The proposal has unusually concrete payout logic, a public reproduction repository, a named proposer, and a bounded recipient set. The main weaknesses are not the absence of a project plan, but payout-specific controls: independent reconciliation of the final executable messages, explicit conflict disclosure, a clear dispute/appeal window, and stronger handling of precedent and edge cases such as prior compensations and alleged abusive miners.

Доказательства

средние

Команда

есть вопросы

Блокеры

2

Почему такое мнение

  • Strongest reason to support: the payout is bounded, formula-driven, and reproducible from on-chain data rather than relying on vague community sentiment.
  • Main reason for conditions: executable transfer safety and recipient correctness need independent reconciliation for a 3M+ GNK payout.
  • Main governance risk: returning slashed/withheld amounts may create perceived precedent or future incentives unless the community explicitly limits the scope.

Пять публичных проверок

3/4

Ценность для сети

The proposal addresses a real network-level accounting and incentive issue: miner rewards that were routed to the gov module after protocol upgrades. Returning them through a transparent restitution process can improve miner trust and clarify that the community pool and gov account serve different roles. However, the benefit is partly private to historical miners and carries precedent risk if repeated without policy boundaries.

3/4

Ясность плана

The payout plan is bounded by epoch range, recipient count, source account, data sources, formula, and transfer mechanism. The repo and CSV/reproduction script materially improve verifiability. Remaining gaps are formal exclusions, appeal handling, and an independently reconciled statement that executable messages exactly match the CSV and prose.

3/4

Доверие к команде

There is a named proposer and a public repo with reproducible computation, which is directly relevant to this exact payout. Team evidence is not based merely on reputation. Still, capacity and accountability are mostly inferred from prepared artifacts and comment engagement rather than a formal review, reporting, or escalation process.

3/4

Дисциплина финансирования

For a payout profile, budget discipline means recipient eligibility, total amount, formula, and executable amount safety rather than line-item budgeting. The proposal provides a deterministic formula and exact split, but it does not subtract prior payouts and the material message summary shows an amount/recipient-like-address summary that should be independently reconciled before execution confidence is high.

2/4

Риски и stewardship

Several risks are acknowledged in discussion, including DDoS incentive/precedent and the choice not to filter suspected bad actors. The proposal explains some mitigations and frames the payout as historical restitution, but conflict disclosure, formal dispute handling, and one-off policy boundaries are underdeveloped.

Оценка команды

Team confidence is solid for this narrow payout computation because there is a named proposer and a public reproducible repository. It is not perfect because there is no independent audit signoff, no structured conflict disclosure, and no formal escalation path for recipient disputes.

Ответственный

ок

Evgenii Maksimenkov is named as proposer and associated with a wallet.

Релевантные доказательства

ок

The public repo and README are directly relevant proof for the exact scope: deterministic calculation of payouts from on-chain data.

Ресурсы и capacity

ок

The work is largely already prepared: code, CSV, and execution messages exist. Ongoing capacity demands are limited to verification and dispute response.

Accountability path

вопрос

The proposer responded in comments and supplied a repo, but there is no formal reporting cadence, independent reviewer, dispute channel, or post-execution reconciliation process.

Условия

  • Publish a final immutable CSV hash and commit hash, and require at least one independent reviewer to reproduce the payout totals from a full node before execution or retrospective endorsement.
  • Reconcile the executable governance messages against the prose and CSV: total output amount, source account, recipient count, vesting batches, dust multisend, and no unintended recipient-like addresses.
  • Add explicit conflict disclosure: whether the proposer, reviewers, or their controlled wallets are included in the recipient set and for what amount.

Блокирующие проблемы

  • Существенный конфликт или compliance risk: The proposer is a miner/community participant and could be in the recipient set, but the source does not provide a structured conflict disclosure or identify whether the proposer benefits from the payout. This is not a hard fail if disclosed and accepted, but it materially affects payout legitimacy.
  • Ключевые утверждения не подтверждены: The proposal supplies strong reproducibility claims, but the review corpus does not include an independent verification report that the CSV, on-chain data, and executable messages exactly match. For a 3M+ GNK payout, independent reconciliation should be a condition.
Источники и доказательстваShow

governance 46

SUCCEEDED

https://gonkascan.com/network/proposals/46

vote.gonka 012f8a32-45ab-4ba8-b6f3-39631d19eb84

expired

https://vote.gonka.vip/tenders/012f8a32-45ab-4ba8-b6f3-39631d19eb84

Evidence used in the opinion

gonkavip/taxreturn/README.md

README.md from gonkavip/taxreturn; 12816 extracted chars at ref main.

https://github.com/gonkavip/taxreturn/blob/main/README.md

Governance executable messages

4 executable messages; types: /inference.streamvesting.MsgBatchTransferWithVesting, /cosmos.bank.v1beta1.MsgMultiSend; actions: VESTING_PAYOUT, BANK_MULTI_SEND; funds: 3054633495669934 ngonka; 1624 recipient-like addresses

https://gonkascan.com/network/proposals/46

GOVERNANCE source

SUCCEEDED: Epochs 132-247 compensation payout from gov module (batch vesting)

https://gonkascan.com/network/proposals/46

Original vote.gonka.vip tender

Canonical imported tender source.

https://vote.gonka.vip/tenders/012f8a32-45ab-4ba8-b6f3-39631d19eb84